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Stuck in the middle with you: the political position of teachers during the
Algerian War of Independence
Abstract

Teachers stand out amongst civil servants by virtue of their embedded position within governed communities,
their moral authority within those communities, and the relative autonomy of their work. This paper
investigates the political position of teachers in Algeria during the War of Independence from France
(1954-62). Although teachers were agents of the French state, and active in facilitating French governance in
Algeria, they were regarded with deep suspicion by the French security services, and subjected to a sustained
surveillance and repression campaign from the very first months of the war. Teachers were caught in a noman’s land between the French State, which employed them, and the nascent Algerian nation, whose children
they cared for in the classroom.
Based on oral history interviews with former teachers, the study of recently declassified public archives in
France and Algeria, and a critical engagement with educational research on teachers working in
disenfranchised communities, this paper investigates the difficult, and often dangerous, position teachers
found themselves in as a result of the war. We examine the routine military incursions into schools by the
French army, arrests and assaults of teachers, and how teachers sought to balance their duties of service to
education with their political resistance to colonialism. However, we also recognise the heterogeneity of the
teaching corps, and the relevance of this factor regarding relations between teachers and members of the
armed forces. The data collected for this study indicates strong disparities in the campaign against teachers,
depending on region, the teacher’s ethnicity, and on the type of school they worked in. Finally, we use this
research as a case study to discuss the tensions which can arise between the right and the left hands of state
within a situation of armed conflict.
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Introduction
The Algerian War of Independence (1954-62) precipitated the end of France’s
settlement colony in North Africa, which it had invaded in 1830. The war pitted the
French security forces against an organized independence movement, principally
represented, and ultimately won, by the Front de Liberation National (FLN) and its
armed division the Armée de Liberation Nationale. The stakes in this conflict were
particularly high on both sides. While for Algerians, the issue was to end over a
century of repressive governance, for the French two factors determined their
resolve to maintain control over the territory. First, France had recently been
defeated and occupied by Germany, and had also been defeated by nationalists in the
colony of Indochina. For many in France, and especially for career soldiers in the
French Army, the Algerian War represented a test of French military prestige and
political resolve. Second, European settlers represented approximately 1/10th of
Algerian inhabitants, and for this reason, northern Algeria was administered as a part
of metropolitan France. For many in France, and for many settles of European
descent, Algeria was viewed as an integral part of the French nation.1
These high stakes created deep rifts within the French state during the war, in
particular between the military and civilian powers of state. The outcomes of these
rifts have been thoroughly researched, especially as they played out between key
senior officers in Algiers and the civilian executive in Paris, resulting in the coup
d’état that brought de Gaulle back to power in 1958 and the failed Putsch des Généraux
that sought to depose de Gaulle in 1961 (see, for example: Horne, 1977; Evans,
2012; Stora, 2012). How this antagonism played out on a daily basis, between the
lower echelons of the army and the civil services, is less well known.2 In this paper,
my aim is to examine the politics of division and suspicion between the French
security services and the teachers in the French educational services, the Education
Nationale. My exposition is based on research conducted in the French ministerial
and military archives as well as on a series of interviews with former teachers and
pupils about their professional and political activities during the war.3 It aims to

A third factor that emerged during the war was the presence of large deposits of natural gas and
crude oil in the Algerian Sahara, the first commercial discovery of oil being in 1956.
2 One relevant study is Sylvie Thénault’s paper on the judicial system during the war. See Thénault,
1998.
3 The two archives I draw material from are the Archives Nationales d’Outre-Mer (ANOM) and the
Services Historiques de la Défense (SHD), hereafter cited by their respective acronyms. Details of
interviewees, who are referred to by pseudonyms, are included in the bibliography. The interviews
referred to here are taken from a larger sample collected during my doctoral research on the politics
1
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explain why members of the military and Interior Ministry perceived teachers to be a
source of dissidence within the ranks of the civil service, and how teachers
responded to this state-sanctioned persecution.
Measures employed by the security services against teachers were not
significantly different from the broader campaign of surveillance and control
exercised across social fields in Algeria at that time.4 These measures can be grouped
into two categories: surveillance and containment. Surveillance measures involved
the ideological screening of teachers applying for posts in Algeria, the use of
informants to track teachers’ political activities, and searches conducted within
classrooms. Containment measures were more diverse as they had to circumnavigate
teachers’ constitutional rights and the legal and institutional protections afforded by
their membership to the civil service. This was facilitated by the state of emergency
instituted in Algeria in 1955.5 The application of the state of emergency opened the
doors to a series of repressive containment measures, including summary
imprisonment, house arrest, physical intimidation, reassignment within Algeria or
removal from the Algerian territory, and torture during interrogation (Prefecture of
Algiers, 1955; Oblie, 2012; Slimani, 2012).
While the surveillance and harassment of teachers did not differ in kind with
practices carried out elsewhere in Algeria during the war, the reasons for targeting
teachers were specifically linked to teachers’ unique political position and function as
members of the state embedded within the population. The sociology of education
has often reinforced the image of the teacher as a social puppet characterized by
conformity and compliance (Grace, 1978). Although I agree that such attributes are
deliberately cultivated within teachers through a series of mechanisms which I shall
discuss further on, my study seeks to contribute to a historiography of teachers as
active resistants to the overbearing interests of state (Giroux, 1988; Girault, 2004;
Gaffney, 2007). Rather than reducing the work of teachers to a technocratic
function, this framework emphasizes their ability to exercise an intellectual autonomy
that contributes to transformative political movements (Giroux, 1988). This does not
deny that teachers are structurally positioned and constructed by the state to transmit
a hegemonic ideology. Rather, the point is that when individual teachers manage to

of education during the Algerian War. Interviewees were identified through advertisements and
snowballing. Interviews followed a semi-structured schedule and were conducted in French.
4 For a study of the broader practices of state-sponsored violence in Algeria during and prior to the
war, see: Thénault, 2012.
5 Loi no. 55-385 du 3 avril 1955 relative à l’état d’urgence et en déclarant l’application en Algérie.
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extricate themselves from that ideology, they can use the social and cultural capital
inherent within their technocratic role to subvert dominant interests.
Insofar as teachers are trained as an intellectual class, they are particularly
vulnerable to this sort of ‘defection’, which explains the high levels of official
mistrust described in this paper. Interestingly, official anxieties about teachers in
post-independence Algeria have received some critical attention (Alexander, Evans
and Keiger, 2002; Kateb, 2006). But the period under French rule remains obscure in
this regard. The thesis supported by my research is that teachers in this period were
targeted by the security forces because they stood out amongst French civil servants
as a potentially dissident force which could function within and against the state
(Gramsci, 1971; Mayo, 2005). This view reflects the Marxian analysis that the state is
the organ of one particular class, and that a key educational function of the state is to
identify the interests of that dominant class with the common good (Marx, 2008;
Gramsci, 1971). This view of the state’s vested interest in education is not strictly
Marxian. Immanuel Kant emphasizes a similar point: “experience teaches us that the
ultimate aim of princes is not the promotion of the world’s good, but rather the wellbeing of their own state, so that they may attain their own individual ends. When
they provide money for educational enterprises, they reserve the right to control the
plans” (1904, p. 120). It may be objected that within a liberal democracy the person
of the sovereign is dispersed amongst the electorate. Whether or not that is the case,
French Algeria was not a democracy in any serious sense of the word. This fact is
documented in any historical study of the colonial period; Patrick Weil (2005), for
example, offers an overview of legal restrictions placed upon Muslims, including
their lack of citizenship status. In this context, the educational system very explicitly
represented French interests over those of indigenous Muslims. Those teachers who
sought to promote the political interests of Muslims as a group violated the
institutional function they had been assigned by the French state.
1

The trouble with teachers

Hostilities in the Algerian War of Independence broke out on the night of October
31st 1954. Approximately one month later, on December 12th, the French Army
circulated amongst its intelligence bureaus a series of maps depicting the distribution
of communist teachers across Northern Algeria (fig. 1). These maps were printed on
tracing paper so that they could be superimposed upon another series of maps
depicting the distribution of “terrorist activities” since October 31st 1954 (fig. 2).
Close observation of the examples shown does not reveal an obvious geographical
correlation. Subsequent historical research has shown that communists within
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Figure 1: Distribution of communist teachers in Algeria, 12 December 1954. SHD, 1H, 1720, D1.

Figure 2: Distribution of insurgent activities in Algeria, 31 October—12 December 1954. SHD, 1H,
1720, D1.
https://scholarworks.umass.edu/lov/vol3/iss3/2
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Algeria were only modestly implicated in the fighting alongside the independence
movement and they were not militarily active in the opening stages of the war
(Horne, 1977). However, these maps are indicative of a strong anxiety amongst
ministerial and military circles about the spread of ideologies hostile to French rule in
Algeria. Within the context of the Cold War, anti-colonial struggles were often seen
as a manifestation of a Soviet-backed geo-political strategy. A 1959 government
report commissioned by the Prime Minister’s office cited that "mass communist
organisations are engaged in an intense propaganda effort in which arguments
favourable to the FLN are rolled into Communist positions" (Cabinet du Premier
Ministre, 1959, p. 47). For Governor General Jacques Soustelle, France faced a threepronged ideological enemy in Algeria: "Russian imperialism disguised as
communism; pan-Arabism directed from Cairo; and anti-Colonialism” (cited in Tyre,
2002, p. 103). The correlation conjectured here between the distribution of
communist teachers and terrorist events stemmed from a broadly held concern
about the potential subversive trickle-down effects of ideologically unorthodox
teachers within the classroom. These maps signal the start of an aggressive campaign,
sustained until the end of hostilities in 1962, on behalf of the French security services
against what was perceived to be an inner threat within the teaching corps.
Bad teachers, it was feared, could poison the water: by undermining French
dominance from within the state schooling apparatus, such teachers could ferment
popular unrest amongst the Muslim Algerian population. Thus, teachers needed to
be singled out for surveillance in order to identify subversive elements within the
ranks who could then be contained or expunged. Crucially, this perception was not
the product of over-zealous petty officers; it ran down from the high echelons of the
French state. In May 1955 (five months after the outbreak of the insurgency), the
Interior Ministry began corresponding with the Ministry of Education about the
urgency of reining in the threat from dissidents within the ranks of the Republic’s
teachers. The preferred means agreed upon was to source teachers in the metropole
and to root out the politically unsound ones before they could set foot on Algerian
soil:
“If I may draw your attention to the necessity of securing the
maximum guarantees concerning the civil servants called to serve in
the Algerian departments. Because of the events in Algeria, it is
obvious that certain attitudes will not be tolerated on behalf of civil
servants who are called upon to exercise a certain influence amongst
the communities in whose midsts they live. I imagine therefore that
you will judge, as I do, that the recruitment for the Schooling Plan in
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Algeria must be carried out with sensitivity to Algeria’s particular
situation and that it would be appropriate, in these circumstances, to
give special attention to the advice requested from prefects on the
candidates residing in their departments prior to the admission or
direct nomination of any candidate for public employment.” [Interior
Minister, 1955]
This passage is typical of governmental correspondence on this topic, wherein the
interlocutors employed vague generalizations to suggest adopting repressive
measures. The issues of separatism and armed conflict that characterized the
situation in Algeria are not evoked, nor is it ever specified which attitudes or
opinions cannot be tolerated from teachers. These are taken as understood, and it is
possible that the correspondents purposefully remained evasive so as not to
inculpate themselves by proposing state-sanctioned discrimination against French
citizens on the basis of party affiliations or political activities (these in themselves
were not illegal at the time). Therefore, in order to ensure the political orthodoxy of
teachers being sent to Algeria from the Metropole, the Ministry of Education agreed
to defer to the Prefect of a candidate’s department in order to vet a candidate’s
political orthodoxy:
“Certainly, the elements susceptible of being sent to North Africa
must, in addition to their pedagogical competencies which the
Ministry of Education is best placed to assess, be absolutely
trustworthy from a national and political point of view. Nothing
would be more dangerous than sending to the Algerian departments
members of the National Education corps who, by their functions,
would contribute to aggravating the current situation. Indeed, we
should beware of certain extremist parties who might make use of
this occasion to infiltrate their elements into the teaching body.”
[Prefect of Pyénées Orientales, 1955]
This document lays out the desired division of labor between the Ministry of
Education on one side and the Interior Ministry and Army on the other. While the
Ministry of Education was responsible for the technical assessment and
implementation of pedagogy, the overarching strategy of colonial education was
directed by the right hand of state. In the words of the Prefect of Constantine: “it is
important that we post teachers for political and psychological reasons”(Prefect of
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Constantine, 1957).6 As the war progressed, the primary function of state schooling
was co-opted in favor of the security agenda. In this optic, the Army and the
Governor General’s office collaborated in the surveillance and repression of
dissident teachers — occasionally this brought the security services into opposition
with the Education Ministry. In 1955, the Prefect of Constantine expelled Marguerite
Chatou, a lycée teacher, from his department on the basis that she was a militant
communist.7 When the Ministry of Education responded by posting her to a (more
prestigious) lycée in Algiers this was perceived as a rebuke. The Governor General
Jacques Soustelle wrote personally to the Interior Minister to ask him to “intervene
with the National Education Ministry to have the concerned party posted in the
metropole, her presence being in any case undesirable in Algeria” (Governor
General, 1955). A recurrent point of annoyance for the Army was the reluctance on
behalf of teachers to fly the French flag or allow their pupils to participate in
patriotic activities during school hours, as well as the Education Inspectorate’s
refusal to intervene on behalf of the Army (Cabinet Civil, 1958). In one memo, the
acting commander for the Eastern province of La Calle complains of the local
inspector’s refusal to allow primary school children to attend the Armistice Day
parade on the basis of a legal technicality:
“In the current situation, where each occasion must be seized to give
the population and to the youth in particular, a civic education which
brings them closer to France to prepare them morally for a choice, it
is profoundly regret- table that under the pretext of intransigently
applying a legal clause, National Education civil servants deliberately
obstruct an initiative organised for the common good.”8 [ChevalierChantepie, 1960]
While there is no indication that the Education Ministry wavered from the hard line
adopted by the government with regards to repressing sympathy for the liberation
movement, its actions were constrained by its own internal due process and
(perhaps) a certain loyalty to its own agents. Any disciplinary action on the Ministry
of Education’s part could only be taken after an internal investigation was carried out
by one of its inspectors. This took time. It also opened the possibility of the security
6 A historical note of interest: the Prefect of Constantine at this time was Maurice Papon, infamous
for his active role in the deportation of Jews under Vichy and for the massacre of Algerians in Paris
on October 17th, 1961.
7 Names have been changed to protect the privacy of the individuals concerned.
8 The choice referred to is perhaps the upcoming referendum on independence, although this was not
officially announced until December 1960.
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services being openly contradicted by a neighboring administration, and it implied a
level of collaboration between the security services and the Education Inspectorate,
which the former may have been unable or unwilling to engage in. The Algerian War
was characterized by a climate of suspicion; the security classification for most
archived cases involving teachers ranges between ‘confidential’ and ‘secret’.
A good illustration of the inter-departmental friction that could arise between the
security and the education services is the issue of conscripting teachers into the
military. This raised the ire of René Billières, the Minister of Education in 1957. In
January of that year, he wrote a letter to the President of the Council, Guy Mollet, as
well as to the Algeria Minister and Defense Minister, to protest this practice of using
planks from one end of a bridge to extend the other end. Noting that the
recruitment and retaining of teachers was “an absolute priority” in Algeria, he
laments the use of qualified teaching personnel for low-level surveillance and
protection duties. Most of these teachers were not conscripted into the regular army
but into local reserve units, called Unités Territoriales (UT’s). While this arrangement
did not completely remove teachers from their posts, it raised the separate problem
of employing teachers to police the very communities in which they taught. Not only
did this force them to patrol in uniform and armed in neighborhoods where their
students and their parents could see them, they could also be called upon to search
and interrogate students’ parents. Billières, who himself had taught literature in a
lycée, was sensitive both to the social standing of teachers and to the Muslim
population’s antipathy to the armed forces. He warns that the practice of employing
teachers as UT’s “can only ruin their credit with the local population” and continues:
“The very principal of incorporating teachers within the Unités
Territoriales completely distorts the role of French culture and of those
entrusted with trans- mitting it in the eyes of the indigenous
populations. What authority can they maintain, what trust can they
inspire amongst the locals, when they are forced to participate in
policing operations, in identity checks, and searches alongside the
police and the C.R.S.”[(Billières, 1957]
The main teachers’ union (the Syndicat National des Instituteurs or SNI) adopted a
similar position on this question, on the basis that the repressive activities of the
security services were at odds with the ideal of the Republican educational tradition
(Desvalois, 1988). In a letter defending one of its members in his refusal to serve in
his local UT, the SNI argued that, "in its very essence, a teacher’s position does not
lend itself to certain activities, which may seem excessive in the eyes of the
population and students’ parents" (SNI, 1954). However, Billières was not against
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the incorporation of education into the pacification campaign tout court. Rather, he
found that confusing the military and the cultural/psychological campaign was a
strategic misstep. “French culture must be the most effective link between the
indigenous populations and metropolitan France” he pressed, “in ruining this pacific
weapon, we would commit a political error” (Billières, 1957).
This view was not shared by his cabinet colleagues. In response, the Algerian
Governor General’s office pointedly refused to implement any exceptions for
teachers with regards to conscription. Members of the UT’s, they argued, “fight,
without provocation, against adversaries who seek to destroy the very principles
which the professor or teacher are entrusted with transmitting. What better mark of
their attachment to their ideal could they offer than taking up arms, when necessary,
to oppose those who aim to annihilate through terror their valuable work?”
(Maisonneuve, 1957). This was an alternative notion of l’idéal de l’éducateur.
The Governor General’s office also disagreed with Billières’s empirical claim
regarding Muslims’ hostility towards French forces. In keeping with the official line
of the French government throughout the war, this memo argues that the FLN’s
message did not have resonance with the Algerian population and that everyday
Muslims in Algeria were opposed to the terrorist tactics employed by the ALN.
Moreover, the memo suggests that this position was more than a factual observation;
it was a tenet of faith necessary to the maintenance French rule in Algeria:
“The Resident Minister in Algeria considers that the law and order
missions imposed upon members of the teaching corps can in no way
ruin their credit amongst the local population, much to the contrary.
He cannot admit [Il ne peut admettre] that missions protecting goods
and persons can be considered as incompatible with the elevated
ideal that the teacher conceives of his own mission.” [Ibid, emphasis
added]
Indeed, the Algerian War of Independence was not simply an armed struggle. Both
the FLN and the French Army recognized that the real stake in the war was political,
not military; they had to compete for sovereign legitimacy over the land and people
of Algeria (Alexander and Keiger, 2002). And for that to occur, they first had to
believe themselves in that legitimacy. For the FLN, this belief could find root in
religious or ethnic identity, or in a socialist opposition to imperialism. For the
French, the military campaign could not be conceived of outside or in opposition to
the French mission civilisatrice that was best exemplified in the Republican classroom.
A further problem with disciplining unorthodox teachers through the normal
channels has to do with the isolated nature of teachers’ work. A teacher might be
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suspected of using their classroom as a platform to disseminate subversive ideas, but
obtaining proof of professional misconduct to justify disciplinary procedures was
another matter. Teachers are perhaps unique amongst rank-and-file civil servants in
terms of the amount of autonomy they have in their work and the lack of
hierarchical oversight they are subject to. Teacher training colleges and unified
educational bureaucracies are meant to limit teachers’ professional independence.
These exert covert forms of control by creating an institutional network bound
together by a common professional demographic, a centralized administration, a
shared curriculum and examination system, and unifying goals and values
(Rousmaniere, 1997; Tardif and Lessard, 1999). However, once the classroom door
is closed, teachers are invested with a social authority which they can employ to
undermine their assigned ideological function. The only witnesses to what occurs in
the classrooms are the students, who are in a submissive position with regards to the
teacher. While inspectorate visits aim to provide some oversight for teachers, these
are more useful for identifying cases of pedagogical incompetence than
manifestations of political deviance, which would not be put on display for the
inspector’s benefit. French primary school teachers had a history of bristling at the
centralized control to which they were subjected. For example, they were at the fore
of movements to legalize union affiliation for civil servants, which only occurred in
1924 (Archer, 1979; Gaillard, 2000). Moreover, the bureaucratic oversight situation
in Algeria was particularly precarious during this period. The conflict disrupted the
normal functions of state in many areas and Academy resources were over-stretched
in order to catch up with bulging deficit in educational provision for Algerian
Muslim children.9 Teachers in this period were often minimally trained, might not be
inspected over the course of an entire school year, and in rural areas one teacher
often had sole control over their class with no other French official on hand
(Bouazza, 2012; Moreau, 2012).
2

Bricolage surveillance and repression

Whereas systemic surveillance was difficult to implement through the Education
Ministry, a bricolage form of surveillance was carried out through the use of paid
informants to infiltrate the education profession, as well as through unsolicited
denouncements from pro- colonist parents and teachers. For example, in May 1955,
Only about 15% of school-aged Muslims were enrolled in school in 1954, as compared with nearfull enrolment in the European and Jewish populations (Commission du Plan d’Equipement Scolaire,
1955).
9
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a concerned parent wrote to the Prefect of Algiers to denounce the subversive
activities of a teacher from his son’s school. The teacher, he reported, had been in
the rue d’Isly after school hours, selling copies of Liberté, an independentist
newspaper which had already had one of its issues banned. The parent explained his
concern thus: “In the present circumstances, it is in my opinion urgent to rid
ourselves of educators who are preparing something other than little French [girls
and boys]” (Anonymous, 1955). Archives from the Prefecture of Algiers show that
the French intelligence services had informants implanted in the principal teachers’
unions and civil society associations related to education, who reported on
discussions during meetings and general political tendencies (Service Départemental
des Renseignements Généraux - Alger, 1960).10
Where the Academy was reluctant to take action in the absence of clear proof of
professional misconduct, the prefectures demonstrated a much lower threshold for
the admissibility of guilt. Accordingly, they were more willing to dispense
punishments against those teachers who had been denounced by colleagues or
informants. Punishments such as house arrest and expulsion did not go to trial. Nor
were they properly investigated. A security officer would write to the Prefect listing
the accusations held against the teacher, but would not be required to produce any
proof or original documentation validating such accusations. So long as the judiciary
was kept out of the process, the division of labor between investigators and civil
authority played very much in the security services’ favor. A Prefect was not obliged
to act on the recommendation of the security services, but nor were they held
accountable if the accusations they brought forth were false.
Within the context of escalating violence, individual members of the military
took more liberties with their authority. Practices of surveillance and harassment
occurred at the initiative of soldiers low in the hierarchy. This was the experience of
Mehdi Kadir, who worked as a primary school teacher in a Muslim neighborhood of
Algiers during the war. While working in this district between 1959 and 1961, Kadir
reports that Army patrols entered and searched his school on several occasions:
Sometimes, we had [military] patrols come in [the school]. They
would arrive, they’d kick in the cupboard doors to see if anyone was
Associations monitored: Ligue française de l’ensiegnement, Associsation pour la sauvegarde et
l’éducation de la jeunesse et le Centre Beausoleil, Groupe d’entreprises de l’education nationale,
SNI/FEN, Synciat Indépendent des Instituteurs, Féderation d’oeuvres Laïques du département
d’Alger, Comité Na- tional d’Action Laïque, Conseil Departemental d’Alger de l’Enseignement
Primaire.
10
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hiding in there. Well once, a patrol came in, they opened the
cupboards and they found books by Mouloud Feraoun. He said,
“who’s this?”. I told him, “he’s a teacher, he’s a writer and a teacher
who taught Muslims” – back then, we said Muslims, you didn’t say
Algerian because the Algerian nationality was ignored, simply banned,
we said Muslims. I said, “he’s somebody who taught Muslim and
French [children], he taught them their language”. The guy looked at
me side- ways, he didn’t like it that I said that. For an Algerian to
teach French to the French. So, I was about say, I was going to
continue my discussion, I was going to tell him, “you for example,
you would have been one of his students”, but I thought I’ll get an
answer but the answer’ll be the machine gun. I shut up. He looked at
me sideways but didn’t say anything. Thankfully, I didn’t say
anything. He would have shot me in front of all my students, the
whole class. I thought about that and I said no, not that. If I must
die, I’ll die with a gun in my hand, but not like this. I won’t make a
spectacle of myself. (Kadir, 2012)
It is unclear how common these sorts of occurrences were. I have not found any
archival evidence to suggest that the practice of having patrols search schools was
officially authorized. However, after 1957, the Army operated with little civilian
oversight in Algeria and often resorted to extra-legal practices (Vidal-Naquet, 2001).
Two other historical witnesses I interviewed also spontaneously recalled similar
incidents of military inspections in schools (Bouazza, 2012; Lemmouchia, 2013).
What is particularly rich about Kadir’s testimony is that it reveals the underlying
racial-religious stakes at play during the Algerian War. The French Army’s task
during the war was to maintain Muslim Algerians under European domination. The
Republican school had historically been used as a tool to justify and reinforce that
domination. It propagated the myth of France’s civilizing mission by institutionally
validating the French language, history and culture. The incorporation of a Muslim
teacher such as Mehdi Kadir could be seen as the accomplishment of that civilizing
mission. But, it could also undermine the implicit French claims to racial superiority
that justified the exclusion of Muslims from the colonial polity.
Kadir, the absent figure of Mouloud Feraoun, and the soldier instantiate a
tenuous negotiation of power between the institution of the school and that of the
army. What is at stake here is who has access to legitimate authority. The soldier is an
agent of state governance, vested with the authority attributed by his race and
legitimized violence. Kadir and Ferraoun, on the other hand, are governed colonial
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subjects. Yet they are also vested with the legitimized authority of the teacher; they
are integrated within the apparatus of cultural production and distribution with
regards to French language and French culture. These two forms of authority derive
from and serve a common source: the French state. But, within the field of state they
jockey for ascendency. The soldier may be able to intrude into the space of
education, but while there he is exposed to the institutional codes of the Republican
school. Sylvie Thénault has argued that the violence of the colonial regime in Algeria
covered a deep anxiety over its own illegitimacy: “In the hushed atmosphere of their
offices, in the subtext of internal memos, never are the colonial authorities sure of
themselves" (2012, p. 307). The soldier’s sideways glance at Mehdi Kadir may have
betrayed that very insecurity.
In his ignorance of Mouloud Feraoun, a prominent Francophone writer, he loses
face in front of the teacher. The social capital that is invested in the teacher’s
professional status is perceived as a threat by the soldier, all the more so because
Kadir’s status disrupts the colonial hierarchy which positions him as a subaltern.
Kadir and Feraoun taught the French their own language (this was true in the
classroom, but it was also true in literary circles where Feraoun became a distinct
voice of Francophonie). The cultural authority of the Muslim teacher posed a symbolic
threat to the colonial order.
Did the security services target Muslim teachers in particular for surveillance and
harassment? This question evades a definitive answer because certain archival
holdings remain restricted, while others are incomplete; also, as mentioned above,
much harassment occurred outside of official channels. However, a review of the
surveillance records from the Prefecture of Algiers can offer an indication. One list
from 1955 records the names of forty-seven teachers engaged in activities “in favour
of communist or nationalist doctrines”; twenty-three of which were Muslim
(Prefecture of Algiers, 1955). Given that only 14% (approximately) of teachers
employed by the French state in Algeria at this time were Muslim, a selection bias
does seem to have occurred in this instance (Bureau psychologique, 1959). That is
not surprising: all Muslims were somewhat suspect within the context of a war that
pitted the two communities against one another. One of the reasons teachers were
targeted by the security services was their close proximity to the Muslim population
in an unregulated setting. Unlike other categories of civil servants, teachers had a
vocation to interact daily with the Algerian population, and often lived alongside the
Muslim majority, in the same neighborhoods and villages. Teachers who were
themselves of Muslim extraction were that much more likely to be sympathetic to
the liberation movement.
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3

The uncomfortable middling position of teachers

Teachers were distinct amongst French civil servants because of their ambivalent
relation to the state. Such ambivalence derived from teachers’ professional identity,
which divided their positional allegiance: on the one side to the state, whose cultural
colonization project they enforced; on the other side to colonized communities,
whose children they cared for in the classroom. Historical evidence indicates that this
often stranded teachers in a middling position between the two sides of the war,
resulting in the conflicts under discussion here. The notion that teachers, by virtue of
their professional identity, occupy an uncomfortable middle ground in modern
society has been advanced in other contexts. Gerald Grace has found that teachers
working amongst the urban poor in Victorian England were often besieged by
several sides:
“The teacher was at the focal point of class antagonisms which he
was expected to ameliorate and contain. He faced the concrete
manifestations of poverty, misery and exploitation and its associated
bitterness and ‘lawlessness’. He was not infrequently attacked and
abused in his attempts to ‘civilize’ the people and his ability to survive
in such a situation depended upon personal resilience and tenacity,
the evolution of a system of ‘management’ and the sustaining effects
of a Christian or missionary ideology.” [Grace, 1978, p. 31]
Richard Johnson argues that teachers from working-class backgrounds were singled
out as meriting particular suspicions in early Victorian England: “Identified with their
own people, teachers might become, by their moral ascendency, ‘active emissaries for
misrule’. The [Education Department’s] ideal was clear: the teacher should stand
mid-way between his patrons and his clients” (1970, p. 104). A similar analysis of the
teacher’s middling position is found in Lee Rainwater’s study of youth workers in
American urban ghettos in the 1960’s, whom Rainwater describes as “increasingly
caught between the silent middle class which wants them to do the dirty work and
keep quiet about it and the objects of that dirty work who refuse to continue to take
it lying down” (1967, p. 2). On Algeria, Fanny Colonna’s study of Muslim traineeteachers between 1883 and 1939 also points to an awkward middling position for
teachers with the wrong background. According to Colonna (1973), Muslim teachers
were assessed on their ability to function as mediators between the European and
Muslim communities in Algeria. In order to perform this function, she argues that
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they were socialized to maintain an “ideal distance” between the colonial and
colonized cultures, making of them hybrid civil servants who did not fully belong in
either camp. Such in-betweenness affected indigenous teachers elsewhere in the
French colonial world as well. According to Jean-Hervé Jézéquel, African graduates
of the William Ponty teacher training college in French West Africa were viewed
with distrust by their own administration: “In the eyes of Europeans, they were
‘detribalised’ and ‘semi-intelectuals’ suspected of being potential opponents of the
colonial order” (2005, p. 528).
Teachers themselves also had to grapple with the ambiguity of their position
during the war. In my interview with Mehdi Kadir (2012), he claimed to have been
supportive of national independence and to have paid FLN dues during the war while at the same time being employed by the French state in the colonial education
project. Indeed, during his time at the teacher training college (école normale) in
Bouzareah, he recalls that amongst Muslim trainee-teachers, sympathy for and
financial support of the FLN were widely acknowledged – though never revealed to
European peers or to college staff:
Interviewer: In 1957, you paid dues to the FLN and at the same time
you were training to become a civil servant for the French state. Did
you feel there was a contradiction between these two positions? Was
it difficult for you to think that you were going to work for France at
the same time as you were working for independence?
Kadir: Yes, it was bothersome. Especially for me as a teacher having
to say to our students, our ancestors the Gauls... Two thousand years
ago our country was called Gaulle and our ancestors the Gauls.
Kadir evokes a common passage in French schoolbooks, which evokes Gaulish
ancestry and Gaulish resistance to Roman rule as a unifying identity narrative.11
Although Kadir recalled being strongly committed to the humanist ideal of teaching,
and even to the French Republican school model, he felt at odds with the work of
acculturation that French schooling performed in Algeria.
However, in certain contexts, this middling position could be exploited in the
exercise of an individual’s political agency. Just as the security services feared, the
position of schoolteacher could be used in favor of the independence movement, as
is exemplified in the testimony of Bilal Bouazza, a head-teacher in a village school
11 Although this passage remains remarkably vivid in the public imaginary, it is unclear how
extensively it was actually used in French colonies. See: Denise Bouche, 1968.
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(Makouda) in Grande Kabylie. In an interview focusing on his experiences in the
classroom, Bouazza recalled a curious ploy he had devised in cooperation with a
student to pass intelligence about French troops based in the village to the Algerian
National Liberation Army (ALN) posted in the surrounding hillsides:
Bouazza: There was intelligence passed with the students, indeed.
There were children who brought messages. So, I would answer.
Interviewer: So, the children would bring you secret messages?
Bouazza: Not all. One or two. Not all.
Interviewer: And the messages came from their parents, or who?
Bouazza: They came from the maquis.12
Interviewer: And what did you do with these messages?
Bouazza: I would answer. There were questions. They asked the
number of [French] soldiers there were. When they changed the
guard.
Because at the time of this interview Bouazza was in very poor health, it was difficult
to extract much detail or precision from his testimony regarding this practice of
passing messages with the ALN through the mediation of school children. However,
his daughter put me in contact with one of his former students, Adlène
Lemmouchia, who remembered taking part in this activity. In the following passage,
Lemmouchia describes how an ALN officer, either a aspirant or a sous-lieutenant,
came to their home one evening and enlisted his services:
Lemmouchia: It was I think in ’58 or ’59, I only know that I was in
class with Monsieur Bouazza. [The officer said to me], ‘you go to
school’? I say ‘yes’. ‘What’s your teacher’s name? What class are you
in?’ I say, ‘Bouazza’. He said, ‘Bouazza? He’s from my town!’ So in
fact, Monsieur Bouazza, whom you met, was from Great Kabylie,
Fort National, and this maquisard was from Fort National and knew
the Bouazza family, who were an important family [des notables] in that
region. He said, ‘I know him, he has an uncle who’s a pharmacist, his
father works in the courthouse in Tizi-Ouzou. [...] You tell him, such
and such sends you, I’m from such and such a place, and he needs to
12 i.e. the ALN operating in the surrounding country-side. The term maquis was originally used to refer
to the French Resistance to the Nazi occupation during World War II, and was (controversially)
appropriated by the Algerian independence movement to describe their own resistance organization.
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give you such intelligence’. What that intelligence was used for... in
any case I completed the mission.
Interviewer: So he told you exactly what they wanted?
Lemmouchia: Oh, yes! He told me for example, ‘who’s the officer in
charge of intelligence? Who runs the interrogations?’ To give a bit the
organisation of the intelligence collection, ‘how do they check the
attendance in school, which days they check?’ [...] He asked for
names and also if there were [troop] movements, preparations. [...] So
I did that. I got the information [from Monsieur Bouazza]. I
remember he dictated and I wrote.
Interviewer: You wrote it down?
Lemmouchia: Yes, I stayed behind after class. He came back from
the shop, I stayed behind so that we didn’t do it in front of everyone.
He gave it to me and I transmitted it. [...]
Interviewer: So you would wait for Monsieur Bouazza after class and
he set you a dictation?
Lemmouchia: [...] Monsieur Bouazza would dictate and I would write.
To remember. Because I can’t remember the name of such a person
and what he does.
The same attribute that made the Army suspicious of Muslim teachers was a mark of
confidence for the ALN. Bouazza was identified as a trust-worthy source of
intelligence first and foremost because he was not of European descent. In all
interviews I conducted with former teachers and students from this period, Muslim
Algerians always signalled this difference as a validating mark of trustworthiness.
While not all Muslims could be trusted – indeed, Bouazza mentioned explicitly that
he never shared light of his political activities with any of the other Muslim teachers
in his schools – the fact that a teacher was European automatically invalidated them
from being admitted into a circle of trust. Bouazza’s ‘security clearance’ was further
reinforced because of a common ethnic-regional heritage he shared with the ALN
officer. They were both Kabyles and they came from the same district of Fort
National. Even though they had never met, as far as the inter- views indicate, they
shared membership to a common network of social proximity. In my interview with
Bouazza, he repeatedly referred to contemporary actors as either Kabyle or not
Kabyle – the former being a mark of integrity that he trusted in his professional and
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political activities. The third validating factor was the distinction of the Bouazza
family within Kabyle society. They were notables, a respectable lineage who had
retained their high social standing under colonialism. While in other colonial
contexts, this might have counted against them, in Algeria, prosperous indigenous
families were not seen as natural collaborators of the colonial regime. They held
positions of esteem, but not of overbearing dominance. The ALN officer knew
Bouazza’s uncle was a pharmacist and his father a legal translator for the regional
tribunal. In a European context, these were not top-of-the-pyramid occupations
associated with old blood. But they represent above all access to learning and formal
qualifications, which for Muslim Algerians were severely rationed by the colonial
government.
Bouazza’s personal indigenous identity, determined by his ethnic, religious and
filial back- ground, confirmed his adherence to the Algerian nationalist cause,
regardless of his status as a French civil servant. On the other side, his professional
identity put him in a unique position to gather intelligence on the military presence in
Makouda and transmit it to the ALN. Others have written about the ways in which
armed conflict shapes human geography and built environments (Eyre, 1984;
Lambert, 2012; Pullan, 2013). In rural Algeria, the conflict placed the school at a
social intersection between the area controlled by the French Army and that
controlled by the ALN. Like most schools in rural Algeria, Bouazza’s school was
situated within the town, while the majority of its students lived in small rural
enclaves in the surrounding countryside, which is mountainous and covered by thick
oak forests (see fig. 3). The French army’s strategy of pacification in this area
consisted in entrenching military units within the towns, from where they could
launch operations in the surrounding villages and countryside. A principal motivation
behind this strategy was to cut off the ALN from sources of material support within
the local population, by securing roads and population centers. School buildings
were often requisitioned by the army as barracks, operational headquarters and
interrogation centers. This was the case in Makouda, where the Army occupied one
courtyard of the school, while classes continued in the remaining facilities (see fig. 4).
Thus, the schoolteacher and the local army unit were literally neighbors, in constant
interaction, often in tense negotiation.
While the army controlled the towns, the ALN remained hidden and mobile
under cover of mountainous vegetation, depending on small rural enclaves for
provisions in food. Children from these communities who attended school, thus
passed on a daily basis from a space in which the ALN could operate, into the town
controlled by French forces. The position of the teacher was exceptional in that he
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Figure 3: Route from Lemmouchia’s home to school in Makouda, © Google.

Figure 4: Floor-plan of Makouda primary school.
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was in physical and administrative proximity to the French army (Bouazza reported
that occasionally he would have lunch with the commanding lieutenant next door),
while also being in daily interaction with the children of the surrounding countryside,
who themselves were part of a wide network of logistic support for the ALN. It was
by virtue of being placed at this social intersection that Bouazza was able to supply
the ALN with information.
4

Conclusion

There exists an optimistic liberal inclination to consider the fields of education and
conflict as inherently opposed to one another. However, the Algerian War of
Independence encroached deep into the field of the Republican school. It is perhaps
not surprising that schools in Algeria during the war became a space of conflict
between the Army and teachers. Structurally, they already constituted spaces of
conflict between the state and the governed population. Gerold Grace argues that
“the sociology of the schools of the urban working class is inextricably associated
with conflict – of class and culture, of ideologies and social processes” (p. 29). The
same can be said of colonial schools. In support of his claim, Grace reviews a
number of militaristic metaphors employed by English Victorian educationalists,
comparing schools to citadels and teachers as soldiers. This notion is also advanced
by Louis Althusser in his analysis of schools as the primary vector of the dominant
ideology of control within society. These Ideological State Apparatuses, he argues,
are “not only what is at stake, but also the locus of class conflict” (1976, p. 24). Once
that conflict escalated into violence in Algeria, teachers were situated in the firing
line.
If the French security services were particularly wary of the teaching corps it is
because the French counter-insurgency campaign was based on a strategy of winning
hearts and minds (Comité Armée-Jeunesse Algérie, 1960; Khane, 2002). Classrooms
were a key instrument within that strategy. David Galula, the leading counterinsurgency theorist to emerge from the ranks of the French Army during the war,
urges:
“Open a school in every occupied village with one or two soldiers as
teachers. Ask the villagers to send at least one 8 to 12-year-old boy
from each family; next, ask that girls attend school in the same way (if
room is lacking, the boys in the morning, the girls in the afternoon).
Every absence must be justified.” [Galula, 2006, p. 285]
The Ministry of Education strongly embraced this strategy, perhaps in part because it
raised its profile within the state: “the creation of schools, demanded by the Algerian
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population, is one of the surest methods we have to win over minds and to oppose
the propaganda directed against us in this region” (Minister of Education, 1955).
However, the risk in this context was that left-wing teachers might use that platform
to propagate subversive ideologies favorable to decolonization. While fighting the
rebellion without, the army also had to fight subversion from within, in order to
preserve the school network as an instrument of governance and linguistic/cultural
dominance. It is perhaps surprising today to think that teachers (usually primary
school teachers) were attributed such influence. However, the strategic position of
teachers in the French system of state governance, as well as their social position
amongst Muslim Algerians was much higher than that currently observable today.
Since the foundation of the national teaching corps (les hussards noirs) in the 1870’s,
teachers had been constructed as representatives of Republican moral and epistemic
authority (Green, 1990; Dubreucq, 2004). In Algeria, this image of authority was
reinforced by colonial power relations. In his memoirs, FLN leader Hocine Aït
Ahmed (2009) identifies an inspirational teacher he had, Monsieur Thomé, as a key
figure in his political awakening. He recalls from his childhood that Algerians around
him had great esteem for teachers above all other French bureaucrats. Fazia Feraoun
(1982), in her historical ethnography of a primary school in rural Kabylie, also notes
the high esteem which villagers had for teachers, an esteem she compares with that
previously reserved for the marabout. So successful was the cultural encroachment of
the French school within this village that in the 1930’s villagers began to refer to the
school bell in order to tell time. Using the school bell as a time reference is
historically significant in that it marks a temporal reorganization of village life in
favor of a French secular model, and reflects cultural positioning in ‘time clashes’
between city hall and church bells in rural France at this time.13
There exists a dialectical tension within the project of state education. State
education is both hegemonic, insofar as it conveys a state-sanctioned ideology, and
liberating insofar as it distributes resources of knowledge and critical reflection which
can be used to negotiate or oppose a governing polity. Such a dialectic was
particularly fragile in the Algerian context, where the discourse of a Republican
education had to be be maintained within an explicitly colonial society. Teachers’
central role in managing that dialectic on the ground positioned them as the keystone
in the project of cultural colonialism — and insofar as France ruled Algeria by means

13

On the politics of clocks and time-telling, see: Morelli and Dierkens, 2008.
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of cultural domination, dissident teachers represented a distinct threat to French rule
in Algeria.
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